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SIMULATION QUANTIZATION
ABEL WOLMAN
Abstract. A solvable anharmonic oscillator is presumably simulable
by a classical computer and therefore by a quantum computer. An an-
harmonic oscillator whose Hamiltonian is of normal type and quartic in
the canonical coordinates is not quantizable. If, as argued here, quan-
tum simulation of a classical physical system entails quantization of that
system, then either there exist nonsimulable, integrable anharmonic os-
cillators or there are no obstructions to simulation-based quantization.
1. Introduction
Landauer’s [1] dictum “information is physical,” implying that computers
should be understood and studied as physical systems, marked computer
science as a physical science. The development of quantum computing and
quantum information theory further consolidated this physical point of view
and with this consolidation came the obverse inclination to view physics
itself, or at least portions thereof, as a computer science. Deutsch [2] spells
out this latter tendency in his influential paper on quantum computing and
the Church-Turing principle:
To view the Church-Turing hypothesis as a physical princi-
ple does not merely make computer science into a branch of
physics. It also makes part of experimental physics into a
branch of computer science . . . The existence of a universal
quantum computer . . . implies that there exists a program
for each physical process.
Smith [3], concurring, argues that the Church-Turing thesis can be
. . . interpreted as a profound claim about the physical laws
of our universe, i.e.: any physical system that purports to be
a “computer” is not capable of any computational task that
a Turing machine is incapable of.
And, in his popular account of quantum computing, Aaronson [4] metaphor-
ically extends again the reach of computer science into physics,
Basically, quantum mechanics is the operating system that
other physical systems run on as application software . . . There’s
even a word for taking a physical theory and porting it to
this OS: “to quantize.”
Date: 9 September 2015.
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Aaronson’s metaphor, however, conceals a complication, the problem of
(first) quantization, how to port classical systems to the quantum operating
system.
First quantization is a mystery, so Nelson opined. The assertion that
“classical physics is false,” [2] does not dispel the mystery, at least not at
the level of elementary quantum mechanics. Here, the logical relationship
between classical and quantum systems is not well understood. In fact, given
that quantum mechanics postulates the quantum Hamiltonian (the funda-
mental quantum observable) shall be defined by quantizing a corresponding
classical Hamiltonian [5], one could almost characterize the relationship as
circular. However, a more practical problem is that there are obstructions
to quantization; that is, there is no universal quantization procedure. Cer-
tain classical systems cannot be consistently quantized and thus cannot be
ported to Aaronson’s quantum OS.
In this note, I show that if we take Aaronson’s metaphor literally; or,
more specifically, if we assume that physical versions of the Church-Turing
thesis are true, then we are faced with several dilemmas principal of which is
that we can define a bijection between all simulable, i.e., finitely realizable,
classical and quantum systems. In other words, as far as computer science
is concerned, classical and quantum physics are indistinguishable. This first
dilemma introduces a second: either there are intuitively simulable classical
systems that are not Turing computable or, contrary to known mathematical
results, there are no obstructions to quantization for simulable classical sys-
tems. Although neither of these latter conclusions, as physical facts, can be
ruled out on their own, it is unclear, at least to the author, how to reconcile
their opposition.
Here, and in the following, I assume familiarity with the basic concep-
tual background of classical and quantum computing including the notions
of Turing machine (TM), universal Turing machine (UTM), quantum com-
puter, universal quantum computer, and the Church-Turing (CT) thesis
(some references are [6] and [7]). In the next section, I review some of this
background primarily to set the stage for later constructions and to moti-
vate the hybrid definition of simulation I give there. In section 3, I discuss
the quantization problem, obstructions to quantization associated with the
Groenewold and van Hove no-go theorem, and define a new, simulation-
based approach to quantization. In section 4, I outline results on the def-
inition, integrability, and quantization of nonlinear oscillators, and show,
among other things, that if there exist obstructions to simulation-based
quantization, then there exist intuitively simulable physical systems, the
aforementioned nonlinear oscillators, that are not Turing computable.
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2. Physical Forms of the Church-Turing Thesis
2.1. Physical CT Thesis and Principle. Originally, the CT thesis was
a mathematical conjecture characterizing the computational capacities of
human computers. It can be stated as follows [2]:
CT Thesis Every ‘function which would be naturally regarded as com-
putable’ can be computed by the universal Turing machine.
With the advent of computing machines as opposed to pencil-and-paper
human computers, a broader, physical, machine-centric version of the CT
thesis has taken hold [8]:
Physical CT Thesis A TM can do (compute) anything a computer can
do.
This is a broader version of the CT thesis not only because it asserts Turing
machines can compute what machines, e.g., laptops, can compute, but be-
cause it asserts that TMs can “model all computation” [8]. (Note, there is
a “strong CT thesis” [7] involving computational complexity. It states that
a TM can perform any computation with at most polynomial slowdown. In
this paper I am concerned with issues relating to simple computability.)
Deutsch [2] points out that although the original CT thesis is a “quasi-
mathema-tical conjecture . . . underlying this . . . hypothesis there is an im-
plicit physical assertion.” Deutsch elevates this implicit physical assertion
to an explicit physical principle:
CT Principle Every finitely realizable physical system can be perfectly
simulated by a universal model computing machine operating by finite means.
Congruent with Landauer’s dictum, Deutsch’s CT principle proceeds from
the intuition that a computer is a kind of physical system; “a computing
machine is any physical system whose dynamical evolution takes it from
a set of ‘input’ states to a set of ‘output’ states.” At the same time, the
principle appears to extend the reach of the physical CT thesis by positing
that a physical system of the appropriate computational type can model,
i.e., simulate, not only all computation, but the motions or dynamics of all
finitely realizable systems (following Nielsen [9], I interpret this last phrase
to mean systems constructible in a laboratory, computers themselves, for
instance).
Much of the above was anticipated and colloquially summarized by Feyn-
man [10] in his groundbreaking paper on computer simulation and quantum
computing:
What kind of computer are we going to use to simulate
physics? Computer theory has developed to the point where
it realizes that it doesn’t make any difference; when you get a
universal computer, it doesn’t matter how it’s manufactured,
how it’s actually made.
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It is important to note, however, that in neither Feynman’s quote nor in my
discussion of the CT thesis and principle above is the meaning of simulation
pinned down. In the next section, I attempt to correct this oversight.
2.2. Simulation. Both versions of the CT thesis, and the CT principle, are
conjectures concerning simulation by computing device (possibly human);
however, they invoke different notions of simulation. The original CT thesis
asserts that all computable functions are computable by TM and all TMs
are computable, meaning simulable, by a UTM, the latter by encoding the
simulated TM and its input as a program in the UTM. Deutsch’s principle
on the other hand refers to “perfect simulation” of physical systems by uni-
versal (quantum) computer meaning the perfect matching of the simulated
system’s input and output distributions by the simulating computer.
The manner in which a UTM simulates a TM is intensive in the sense that
the internal (computational) behavior of the UTM is indistinguishable from
the simulated TM. It is this intensive, mimicry, view of simulation that
Feynman [10] has in mind in the previously quoted paper on simulating
physics.
So what kind of simulation do I mean? There is, of course, a
kind of approximate simulation in which you design numer-
ical algorithms for differential equations, and then use the
computer to compute these algorithms and get an approxi-
mate view of what physics ought to do. That is an interesting
subject, but is not what I want to talk about. I want to talk
about the possibility that there is to be an exact simulation,
that the computer will do exactly the same as nature.
Feynman’s exact simulation is synonymous with intensive simulation. In
contrast, Deutsch’s “perfect” simulation is extensive, inputs and outputs of
the simulated system and simulating computer must agree in some way, but
their internal behavior (“motions” [2]) need not. However, as Deutsch [11]
later emphasizes, given any computer C, a universal computing machine,
specifically, a network of universal quantum gates, “could emulate more
than just the relationship between the output of C and its input. It could
produce the output by the same method – using the same quantum algorithm
– as C.”
There are further uncertainties in the literature concerning the mean-
ing of simulation. For instance, Piccinini [12] argues that Deutsch’s CT
principle is “ambiguous between two notions of simulation.” On the one
hand, it refers to simulation of one computing device by another, on the
other, it entails computational modeling, “the approximate description” of
a physical system’s dynamics (Feynman’s “numerical algorithms for differ-
ential equations”). According to Piccinini, with respect to the first notion
of simulation the CT principle is a form of “ontic pancomputationalism,”
the assertion that “everything in the universe is a form of digital comput-
ing system” [12]. If instead the CT principle is understood with respect to
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approximate simulation, then it is “the claim that any physical process can
be computationally approximated to the degree of accuracy desired in any
given case” [12].
For the purposes of this paper, I adopt the following hybrid definition of
simulation:
Definition (Simulation) A computing device simulates a physical sys-
tem if it can intensively approximate the dynamical evolution and observ-
ables of that system to the degree of accuracy desired in any given case.
Here, the phrase physical system includes computing devices; and intensive
approximation includes the limiting case in which the simulating computing
device behaves exactly, in Feynman’s sense (or Turing’s, in the classical
theoretical case), like the simulated system. My definition is perhaps closest
to Sandberg and Bostrom’s [13] definition of emulation: a computer emulates
another computer or system if it “mimics the internal causal dynamics [of
the emulated computer or system] (at some suitable level of description).”
There are several reasons for defining simulation in this way: first, it
reflects extant approaches to simulation in the literature; second, it leads
to counterintuitive results; and third, because it leads to counterintuitive
results it may provoke researchers to clarify what simulation by computer
means.
3. Quantization
“Classical physics is false” [2]; quantum physics is true; so stipulated. Still,
in practice, virtually all (non-relativistic, non-spin) quantum systems are
(first) quantizations of classical systems. As Giulini [14] writes,
So far a working hypothesis has been to define quantum the-
ories as the results of some ’quantization procedures’ after
their application to classical theories. One says that the
classical theory (of ’something’) ’gets quantized’ and that
the result is the quantum theory (of that ’something’).
In this section, I outline the quantization problem, that is, the problem of
associating a quantum system to a given classical one. This problem is not
solvable in general; there is no consistent scheme for quantizing all classical
systems. After reviewing certain obstructions to quantization, the no-go re-
sult of Groenewold and van Hove, I propose a new, simulation approach to
quantization of (simulable) classical systems based on the fact that quan-
tum computers obey the physical CT thesis [7]. I also describe a second,
presumptively stronger form of simulation quantization based on Deutsche’s
CT principle. However, we will see that the hybrid definition of simulation
allows us to identify these weak and strong forms of simulation quantization.
3.1. The Quantization Problem. In mathematical terms, the first, i.e.,
non-field-theoretic, quantization problem is to find a rule that simultane-
ously assigns to any symplectic phase space P = (P, ω), representing the
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states of a classical physical system, a complex Hilbert space HP , repre-
senting the states of a quantum system, and to any classical observable
f ∈ C∞(P ), an operator from the vector space A(HP ) of self-adjoint oper-
ators on HP . If one restricts attention, as I will here, to classical systems
with Euclidean phase space P = (R2n, ω), a solution to the quantization
problem is a representation
ρ : C∞(P )→ A(HP )
f 7→ ρ(f)
satisfying the following conditions:
(1) ρ(f + g) = ρ(f) + ρ(g),
(2) ρ(λf) = λρ(f) for λ ∈ R,
(3) ρ({f, g}) = (i/ℏ) [ρ(f), ρ(g)]
(4) ρ(1) = I, where 1 is the identity and I the identity operator,
(5) ρ(qi) and ρ(pi) act irreducibly on HP .
A representation satisfying these five conditions is called a full quantization
of P with (qi, pi) = (q, p) canonical coordinates on T
∗P ∼= R2n, {·, ·} the
Poisson bracket on the Lie algebra C∞(P ), and [·, ·] the commutator on
the Lie algebra A(HP ). By the Stone-von Neumann theorem, condition 5
implies ρ is the Schro¨dinger representation where HP = L
2(Rn), ρ(q) = q,
and ρ(p) = (1/i)∂/∂q [15]. (I am glossing over a number of technical details.
For a more precise account consult [15] or [14].)
For P = R2n, Groenewold [16] and van Hove [17] proved the following
no-go theorem:
Theorem (Groenewold-van Hove) There exists no full quantization of
the Lie subalgebra of polynomial observables P in C∞(P ).
Hence there is no full quantization of C∞(P ). At the same time, van Hove
showed that restricting ρ to the Heisenberg subalgebra P1 = span{1, q, p} of
P produces the standard Schro¨dinger quantization of P . (Note, the Heisen-
berg algebra is the minimal subalgebra in P that coordinatises phase space
P .) Furthermore, ρ can be extended to a full quantization of the Lie sub-
algebra P2 = span{1, q, p, q2, p2, qp}. Gotay [18] refines these results; for
polynomial functions on R2n he shows there are precisely two maximal Lie
subalgebras, P2 and P∞,1, that contain the Heisenberg algebra P1 and are
quantizable. (P∞,1 is the subalgebra of polynomials linear in p with coef-
ficients arbitrary polynomials in q.) In short, there is no full quantization
for polynomial Lie subalgebras on R2n containing terms with degree greater
than 2 in both p and q.
Although the Groenewold-van Hove no-go theorem appears special in that
it applies to the flat phase spaces R2n, obstructions to quantization are
generic in the following categorical sense. Let C denote Weinstein’s [19]
classical category of symplectic manifolds and symplectomorphisms, and Q
the quantum category of complex Hilbert spaces and unitary transforma-
tions, then the quantization problem can be restated as the more general
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problem of finding a functor ∆ : C → Q consistent with the Schro¨dinger
quantization. Gotay [20] utilizes Groenewold and van Hove’s result to show
that no such functor exists.
3.2. Weak and Strong Simulation Quantization. The physical CT the-
sis and the CT principle suggest an alternative approach to the quantization
problem based on simulation of classical systems. Rather than construct a
quantum representation of a classical system, one solves the quantization
problem by constructing a (universal) quantum computer that simulates the
classical system. This quantum simulation is then defined to be the quanti-
zation of the classical system. As discussed below, the resulting simulation-
based quantization has weak and strong forms corresponding to the physical
CT thesis and CT principle, respectively, although we will also see that the
hybrid definition of simulation allows us to identify these forms.
Simulation-based quantization embodies the algorithmic conceptualiza-
tion of quantization described by Berezin [21].
It is generally accepted that . . . quantization is an algorithm
by means of which a quantum system corresponds to a clas-
sical dynamic one.
Berezin continues:
Furthermore, it is required that in the limit h→ 0 where h is
the Planck’s constant, a quantum dynamic system change[s]
to a corresponding classical one. This requirement is called
the correspondence principle. It is quite obvious that there
exist quite a lot [of] quantizations obeying the correspon-
dence principle; the quantum description of a physical phe-
nomena is more detailed than the classical one, and so there
are certain phenomena the difference between which is dis-
played in their quantum description, whereas their classical
description does not show this difference.
Below we will see how a truly algorithmic approach to quantization, based
on physical versions of the CT thesis, leads to a very different relationship
between classical and quantum systems compared to the conventional one
Berezin describes.
It may help to introduce some notation. (The reader is forewarned that
rigor does not thereby ensue. The following notation helps me clarify cer-
tain ideas, but the arguments remain informal.) Let CU denote a universal
classical computer corresponding to the physical instantiation of a universal
Turing machine and let QU be a universal quantum computer corresponding
to the physical instantiation of a universal quantum computer (for example,
QU could be a quantum computer constructed from a network of universal
quantum gates). Then weak simulation quantization is defined as a map
sqw : Cc −→ Qc
x 7−→ QU(x)
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where Cc is the set of all classical computers, Qc the set of all quantum
computers, and QU(x) is the quantum simulation of the classical computer
x ∈ Cc. (Again, here and in what follows, simulation means hybrid sim-
ulation as defined in section 2.2.) Because quantum computers obey the
physical CT thesis [7], the quantum simulation QU (x) defining sqw is guar-
anteed to exist for any x ∈ Cc, and hence all classical computers are weak
simulation quantizable.
In addition, given any quantum computer y ∈ Qc, the physical CT thesis
guarantees the existence of a weak simulation dequantization or correspon-
dence-principle map
sdw : Qc −→ Cc
y 7−→ CU(y)
constructed in the obvious way. In the exact, Feynman-Turing-limit, the
simulations sqw and sdw are inverses:
sdw ◦ sqw = 1Cc and sqw ◦ sdw = 1Qc
where ◦ is the composition of quantization and dequantization maps induced
by the simulation compositions CU (QU (x)) and QU(CU (y)), respectively,
and the identity maps indicate self-simulation, e.g., 1Cc(x) = x: the self-
simulation of classical computer x is simply x itself. In fact, for any fixed
level of accuracy, the approximate simulations sqw, sdw are inverses resulting
in an (infinite) family of quantization, dequantization correspondences.
The CT principle defines strong forms of simulation quantization and
dequantization. Let P be a classical system (P , or its states, might be
mathematically realizable, for example, as a symplectic manifold, but this
is not required). Strong simulation quantization is defined as a map
sqs : C −→ Q
P 7−→ QU(P )
where C is the set of all finitely realizable classical systems, Q the set of all
finitely realizable quantum systems, and QU(P ) is the quantum simulation
of the classical system P ∈ C. The existence of sqs is guaranteed by the
CT principle, which, as discussed earlier, extends the physical CT thesis to
include simulation of all finitely realizable physical systems.
As with weak simulation quantization, strong simulation quantization has
an associated dequantization map
sds : Q −→ C
H 7−→ CU(H)
whereH ∈ Q is a finitely realizable quantum system. Analogous to the weak
case, in the exact limit sqs and sds are inverse mappings:
sds ◦ sqs = 1C and sqs ◦ sds = 1Q
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with ◦ induced by simulation compositions and where the identity maps
are defined on all finitely realizable classical and quantum systems. As in
the weak case, there exists a family of strong quantization, dequantization
correspondences parametrized by degrees of accuracy.
Clearly, Cc ⊆ C and Qc ⊆ Q, hence strong entails weak simulation quan-
tization. However, in the exact limit of intensive hybrid simulation we can
identify a finitely realizable classical physical system with a subprocess (pro-
gram) of its universal simulator (classical or quantum), hence in the exact
limit sqw entails sqs. In this case, it makes sense to simply refer to simulation
quantization and dequantization maps
sq : C −→ Q and sd : Q −→ C
without, that is, weak or strong qualifiers. I adopt this abbreviated termi-
nology below.
To recap, simulation quantization solves the quantization problem by con-
structing a program running on a quantum computer that reproduces the
entire behavior, dynamics and observables, of the simulated classical sys-
tem with any desired level of accuracy. This is a truly algorithmic, indeed
physical, approach to quantization unlike standard methods, which produce
theoretical representations of the classical system and are provably not al-
gorithmic.
Simulation quantization differs from standard quantization in another im-
portant respect; it has an inverse, simulation dequantization. Although this
property is not subject to mathematical proof, it is, as indicated above, an
informal consequence of the definition of simulation. By construction, there
is (at any fixed degree of accuracy on in the exact simulation limit) one
correct (real) quantum simulation of any given finitely realizable classical
system since the given (real) system is unique; hence there is one correct
simulation quantization of this system. Similarly, there is one correct classi-
cal simulation of any finitely realizable quantum system because this system
is also unique, hence there is one correct simulation dequantization of this
system. The resulting bijection
C ∼= Q
between finitely realizable classical and quantum systems can be interpreted
to mean that computer science, through its acceptance of physical versions
of the CT thesis and exact, intensive simulation, cannot computationally
distinguish between classical and quantum physics. (This uniqueness ar-
gument seems reasonable metaphysics, but see for example the conflicting
metaphysics associated with homotopy type theory [22], Leibniz equiva-
lence [23], and mathematical structuralism [24].)
A further implication is that in this restricted computer-science universe,
there are no obstructions to quantization: every finitely realizable classical
system is simulation quantizable. This conclusion is unproblematic if all
finitely realizable classical systems have standard quantizations, in which
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case simulation quantization does not contradict standard obstruction re-
sults. However, as described in the next section, there appear to be finitely
realizable systems, integrable nonlinear Hamiltonian oscillators, that are
simulation quantizable, but are not quantizable in the usual sense. (Note,
from now on the phrase “obstructions to quantization” will mean the system
in question is subject to the Groenewold and van Hove no-go theorem or
some generalization thereof.)
It might be useful at this juncture to reexamine Berezin’s “generally ac-
cepted” notions about quantization in light of the definition and properties
of simulation quantization. As already mentioned, simulation quantization
is a quantization algorithm, physically instantiated. First quantization is a
mystery because it is not an algorithm; this, in essence, is the meaning of
the Groenewold-van Hove no-go theorem. The powerful principle that al-
lows us to construct a quantization algorithm, the CT principle (the physical
CT thesis will do), also allows us to construct the inverse correspondence-
principle or dequantization algorithm. Thus, according to the CT principle,
and contradicting Berezin, the quantum description of a (finitely realiz-
able) physical phenomenon is not more detailed than the classical one. In
fact, even the correspondence limit h → 0 no longer appears, though, con-
jecturally, it will reappear in the intensive, hybrid simulation limit. As
discussed in more detail below, simulation quantization relocates standard
quantization schemes and the correspondence principle entirely within either
the quantum or classical domain.
Others do not drawn the same conclusions regarding the physical impli-
cations of physical interpretations of the CT thesis. Deutsch provides one
explanation for this, based on what might be called the “too strong” or con-
tinuum exception. In effect, Deutsch locates classical, that is, continuous
physics, outside of computer science. The CT principle, he writes [2],
. . . is so strong that it is not satisfied by Turing’s machine in
classical physics. Owing to the continuity of classical dynam-
ics, the possible states of a classical system necessarily form
a continuum. Yet there are only countably many ways of
preparing a finite input for T [UTM]. Consequently T cannot
perfectly simulate any classical dynamical system.
Like the Chesire cat all that remains of the classical computer is its count-
able grin. But then, what sort of device is the computer on which I am
writing this sentence? If it is not a classical dynamical system, then what is
it? My computer, modulo its quantum aspects, its laser hard drive, etc., is
a finitely realizable physical system and is self-simulating as I type. While
the continuum problem is a barrier to understanding the boundary between
classical and quantum systems, the continuum exception disembodies classi-
cal computing altogether. Turing’s machine becomes a ghost; information is
no longer physical. Perhaps more significantly, as “no experiment allows us
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to have access to real phenomena on a very small scale,” [25], the continuum
exception has no real empirical content.
Of course, one could go one better and simply deny that classical comput-
ers as classical dynamical systems exist. For, as stipulated earlier, classical
physics is false. An honest if blunt philosophy, this implies, like Deutsch’s
continuum exception, that Turing machines model nothing. It also renders
moot a variety of heretofore interesting questions in computer science and
computational complexity theory, not least of which is the question con-
cerning the relative efficiency of quantum versus classical computers. More
importantly, denying that classical dynamical systems exist denies the mys-
terious relationship between quantum and classical physics, and therefore,
between quantum and classical computers, and thus might not be the last
word on the subject.
The CT principle is, as Deutsch says, a strong principle. Quantum and
dequantum algorithms are actually beside the point; there is simply a uni-
versal machine. The issue taken up next is how this universal machine, or
to avoid being accused of ontic pancomputationalism, this computer-science
universe of finitely realizable systems, relates to the universe of physics.
4. Nonlinear Oscillators
In this section, I describe an integrable, in fact solvable, nonlinear oscillator
“manufactured” by Bruschi and Calogero [26]. Because it is solvable, this
oscillator is presumably simulable, or finitely realizable, and hence simula-
tion quantizable. However, this classical system fails to be quantizable in
the usual sense since its Hamiltonian is of normal type and quartic in the
canonical coordinates q.
The following background discussion of many-body Hamiltonian mechan-
ics and nonlinear oscillators is from Calogero [27] and Bruschi and Calogero
[26]. Further details can be found in these sources and in [28] and [29].
4.1. Integrable N-body Hamiltonian Systems. An N -body Hamilton-
ian system in canonical coordinates qi and momenta pi, i = 1, . . . , N , is
characterized by a Hamiltonian function H(qi, pi) satisfying the following
equations of motion:
q˙i = ∂H(q, p)/∂pi,
p˙i = −∂H(q, p)/∂qi.
Here an overdot indicates differentiation with respect to time t and q =
(q1, . . . , qN ), p = (p1, . . . , pN ) are N -vectors.
The Poisson bracket {·, ·} on system observables f(p, q) and g(p, q) is
defined by
{f, q} =
N∑
i=1
(
∂f
∂qi
∂g
∂pi
−
∂f
∂pi
∂g
∂qi
)
,
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with the time evolution of any observable quantity f(p, q) given by
f˙ = {f,H}.
From this last equation it follows that an observable f(p, q) that commutes
with H, {f(p, q),H(p, q)} = 0, is a constant of the motion,
f˙(p, q) = 0.
We say an N -body Hamiltonian system is (Liouville) integrable if it has N
observables fi(p, q), i = 1, . . . , N , that are constants of the motion and are
in involution, meaning,
{fi(p, q), fj(p, q)} = 0,
for i, j = 1, . . . N .
All one dimensional Hamiltonian systems are integrable since the Hamil-
tonian itself satisfies {H(p, q),H(p, q)} = 0. However, integrable systems are
special since their time evolution cannot be chaotic, and “chaotic behavior
is in some sense generic for Hamiltonian systems with confined motions . . . ”
[27]. Even if the motion of an integrable system is regular, it may still be
very difficult to find solutions to its equations of motion. Integrable sys-
tems for which solutions can be found, or can be determined using purely
algebraic operations, are called solvable.
One further piece of terminology, a Hamiltonian system is of normal type
if its Hamiltonian has the form
H(p, q) = T (p) + V (q),
where
T (p) =
1
2
N∑
i=1
p2/mi
is a kinetic energy term in the canonical momenta with point masses mi and
V (q) is a potential function of the canonical coordinates, independent of the
momenta.
4.2. Nonlinear Oscillators. Calogero [27] (based on work first reported
in [26]) shows how to manufacture integrable Hamiltonian systems from
exactly treatable, matrix evolution equations. This is a three-step process,
which I outline in the case of the (quartic) nonlinear oscillator of special
interest here.
First Calogero proves that the matrix equation
(1) U¨ =
1
2
(AU + UA) + bU3,
with U an N × N matrix of arbitrary rank, A a constant matrix, and b a
scalar, is integrable, indeed solvable, as a special, periodic case of the non-
abelian Toda lattice, a system shown solvable by Krichever [30]. Equation
(1) can also be expressed in terms of Lax pairs and hence is integrable for
this reason as well [27].
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Second, Calogero parametrizes the matrix evolution equation (1) in terms
of 3-vectors, producing Newtonian evolution equations. This last, third
step creates a number of different Newtonian equations of motion each
interpretable as many-body, normal-type Hamiltonian systems in three-
dimensional Euclidean space. These systems are velocity-independent and
invariant under rotations of 3-space and hence can be viewed as systems of
nonlinear oscillators. Indeed, one of the systems constructed in this manner
is an anharmonic oscillator whose Hamiltonian potential term is quartic in
the canonical coordinates (equation 3.3 in [26]):
H =
1
2
N∑
i,j=1
[(~pij · ~pji)− πijπji]−
1
2
N∑
i,j,k=1
aij [(~rjk · ~rki)− ρjkρki]
−
b
4
N∑
i,j,k,l=1
{
2 [ρijρkl (~rjk · ~rli) + ρijρli (~rjk · ~rkl) + ρijρjk (~rkl · ~rli)]
−ρijρjkρklρki + 2 [(~rij · ~rkl) · (~rjk · ~rli)− (~rij · ~rkl) · (~rjk · ~rli)
− (~rij · ~rkl) · (~rjk · ~rli)]− (~rkl ∧ ~rli) · (ρij~rjk + ρjk~rij)
}
In this equation, the canonical coordinates are expressed as 3-vectors ~rnm
and pseudo-scalars ρnm; the canonical momenta as 3-vectors ~pnm and pseudo-
scalars πnm with n,m = 1, . . . , N . The operators ∧ and · are the standard
wedge and scalar products on 3-vectors.
As Bruschi and Calogero [26] observe, the nonlinear oscillator defined by
H has
. . . obvious and ubiquitous applicative interest, inasmuch as
it generally provides the first nonlinear (‘unharmonic’) cor-
rection to the behavior of linear (‘harmonic’) oscillators, the
physical relevance of which is of course universal.
Furthermore, being solvable, it seems reasonable to conclude that the dy-
namical system defined by H is simulable, and is therefore simulation quan-
tizable. However, H is quartic in the 3-vectors ~rnm, hence in the canonical
coordinates, hence by Groenewold and van Hove’s obstruction result (see
section 3.1), the system defined by H is not quantizable. The Hamiltonian
H defines a relatively simple classical system that is simulation quantizable,
but is not quantizable in the usual sense.
If this result is surprising, the alternative is no less so. If there is an
obstruction to the simulation quantization of Bruschi and Calogero’s an-
harmonic oscillator, then we have discovered a regular classical system of
“applicative interest,” the first nonlinear correction to the ubiquitous har-
monic oscillator, that is not quantum simulable and hence is not classically
simulable. In short, H defines a simulable dynamical system that is not
Turing computable.
4.3. Quantizing Simple Nonlinear Oscillators. It is beyond the scope
of this paper (to attempt) to quantize, in the standard sense, Calogero
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and Bruschi’s quartic oscillator. Still, some of the peculiarities one might
expect from such an undertaking can be seen in Calogero and Graffi’s[31]
and Calogero’s [32] quantization of three simpler, one-degree of freedom
nonlinear Hamiltonian oscillators. This triumvirate of related systems are
defined by the following classical Hamiltonians:
H(p, q) =
1
2
[
p2q3
c
+ c
(
q +
1
q
)]
, (2)
H(p, q) =
1
2
[
p2 sin2(q) sin(2q)
2c
+
2c
sin(2q)
]
, (3)
H(p, q) =
1
2
[
p2 sin2(q) sin(2q)
2c
+ 2c cot(2q)
]
. (4)
The constant c in the Hamiltonian of equation (2), is a positive real number,
while in equations (3) and (4), c is an arbitrary real number. Because the
dynamical systems modeled by these Hamiltonians are isochronous, that
is, all of their classical motions are nonsingular and periodic with period
2π, it is “natural” [31] to view them as integrable, nonlinear, unharmonic
oscillators.
It turns out that canonical (Weyl) quantization of these systems produces
“remarkable ambiguities” [31]. The most relevant of these for highlighting
the differences between simulation and standard quantization is the fact
that for each the canonical quantization depends on the value of c, but the
classical dynamics does not.
For example, the constant c does not appear in the Newtonian equation
(5) q¨ =
3q˙2
2q
+
1
2
q
(
1− q2
)
associated to Hamiltonian (2) above. This means that the canonical coor-
dinate q(t) does not depend on c and that c is a simple scale factor in the
canonical momentum p(t). However, as Calogero and Graffi demonstrate,
the ground state E0 of the quantized Hamiltonian does depend on c. This
peculiar result illustrates the well-known fact that, in general, canonical
transformations do not commute with quantization [33]; that is, “. . . it may
make a difference whether one quantizes before or after having performed a
canonical transformation” [31]. Calogero and Graffi go on to prove that one
can eliminate all such “. . . difficulties and paradoxes: at a cost, however, of
imposing restrictions on the constant c which have no classical component”
[31]. Lest the reader miss the point, they add:
The fact that these different alternatives depend on the value
of the constant c, whose presence in the Hamiltonian (1) [(2)
above] does not affect at all the behavior of the correspond-
ing classical system . . . provides an example—striking by its
remarkable simplicity—of the peculiarity of quantization.
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Perhaps equally striking is the fact that simulation quantization can
resolve these difficulties and paradoxes as well. Assuming one-degree-of-
freedom, integrable, isochronous oscillators are simulable, then they must
be simulation quantizable via a unique quantum simulation, that is, one
having a single ground state independent of the value of the constant c
in the classical Hamiltonian. Berezin’s observation (quoted in section 3.2)
that there are phenomena distinguishable by their quantum, but not their
classical description, anticipates these anharmonic systems exactly, and is
completely wrong in the context of simulation quantization.
As in the case of the quartic oscillator, there is a converse and equally
counterintuitive scenario. If simulation quantization is obstructed, there
exist simple one-dimensional classical systems that are intuitively simulable,
but are not Turing computable.
4.4. The Quantization Problem Revisited. I argue above that there is
a tradeoff between simulation and quantization for certain classical systems.
This tradeoff is unproblematic if we believe that the systems in question need
not be simulable, or, alternatively, if simulation quantization does not solve
the quantization problem. Because the anharmonic oscillators described
earlier are integrable they are presumably simulable. Although I offer no
proof of this assertion, it seems both intuitively reasonable and consistent
with the literature (for example, on the non-computability of non-integrable
systems, see [34] or [35]).
Does simulation quantization solve the quantization problem? If quanti-
zation is broadly construed as “an algorithm by means of which a quantum
system corresponds to a classical dynamical one,” [21], then on the informal
strength of physical versions of the CT thesis it does. However, because the
simulating quantum system behaves exactly like the simulated classical sys-
tem, the relationship between simulation quantization and the quantization
conditions from section 3.1 is indirect.
Simulation quantization is physical. It is, so to speak, a hardware-level
quantization of a classical system. If this hardware-level quantization ex-
ists, it induces a software-level map between the mathematical specification
of the classical system in the symplectic category to that of the simulat-
ing quantum system in the Hilbert space quantum category. For instance,
suppose Calogero’s nonlinear oscillator is simulation quantizable. By the
Groenewold-van Hove no-go theorem, the corresponding induced represen-
tation fails one or more of the full-quantization conditions listed in section
3.1, most likely condition 5: the induced representation is (infinitely) re-
ducible. However, by the CT principle, the physical, simulating quantum
system has a unique representation, different representations produce physi-
cally different quantum systems, which will not correspond to, and hence not
give the correct simulation of Calogero’s classical oscillator. In this sense,
there are no obstructions to simulation-induced quantization.
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Whether one accepts this induced-level argument or not, simulation quan-
tization fundamentally alters the quantization problem by locating it entirely
within the quantum (or classical) category. In the quantum category, ob-
structions to quantization are now obstructions to transforming one quan-
tum system, the quantum simulation, into another, the system’s standard
Hilbert space representation. (And via dequantization, the quantization
problem can be pulled back to the classical category.)
Physical instantiations of the CT thesis similarly affect the correspon-
dence principle. Because every finitely realizable classical system has a
unique quantum simulation, there is a new correspondence principle in which
quantum systems correspond to other quantum systems, the simulations of
classical systems. In this sense, classical physics emerges not as h→ 0, but
in some quantum simulation limit.
5. Conclusion
How is the quantum simulation of a classical system related to its quanti-
zation? Through informal arguments based on a hybrid definition of sim-
ulation and physical versions of the CT thesis, I have argued two main
points. First, if physical versions of the CT thesis are true, then there exist
simulation quantization and dequantization maps that define a one-to-one
correspondence C ∼= Q between finitely realizable classical and quantum
systems.
Second, either there are no (induced-level) obstructions to simulation
quantization or there exist intuitively simulable classical systems that are
not Turing computable. Neither of these choices is particularly palatable.
The correctness of standard quantization methods are called into question
if there are no obstructions to simulation quantization, while the alternative
implies the existence of non-chaotic, incomputability. This tradeoff under-
scores a broader issue: how is the universe studied by computer scientists, as
characterized by the correspondence C ∼= Q, related to the universe studied
by physicists? We have come, in a sense, full circle, as this is precisely the
sort of question the CT principle is supposed to address.
To close, I outline two additional results accruing to this general line of
reasoning. The first may have practical consequences. The second relates
to dequantization and concerns a longstanding issue in quantum theory.
As mentioned earlier, given a specified level of accuracy, hybrid simula-
tion allows us to identify the sets Cc = C and Qc = Q, that is, respectively,
the set of classical computers with the set of finitely realizable classical sys-
tems, and the set of quantum computers with the set of finitely realizable
quantum systems. One way of interpreting this result is that every compu-
tation, every simulation, is a physical system. Computation thus reified is
either physically meaningful or not. In particular, a classical simulation is
physically meaningless if the associated classical system is not quantizable.
The practical side of this arises as follows [36]. Suppose we are simulating a
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complicated, classical system and are able to make continuing improvements
to the accuracy of our simulation. Can we be sure that the simulation is
converging to the system we are modeling, that is, can we be sure we are
simulating what we think we are simulating? If there are obstructions to
simulation quantization and the physical system corresponding to our sim-
ulation is not quantizable, then the answer is no. Indeed, the more accurate
our classical simulation becomes the less we in some sense know about the
system to which, we theorize, it converges.
The proceeding focuses on the quantization aspect of simulation and phys-
ical interpretations of the CT thesis. However, the consequences of the ex-
istence of the inverse, dequantization map are equally curious. As argued
in section 3.2, the existence of the dequantization map follows from the
CT principle; specifically, every finitely realizable quantum system can be
simulated by a UTM. By definition, UTMs are classical, deterministic, and
local, a UTM accesses information only on the portion of tape being scanned
[37]. In other words, a UTM is a local hidden variable theory. Given recent
tests of local realism [38] producing nearly loophole-free violations of Bell’s
inequality, the CT principle appears to be a strong physical principle indeed.
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